The Hinrich Foundation Trade Podcast
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The Hinrich Foundation Trade Podcast
Special Ep. - How the US-China race shifted from tariffs to chokepoints
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In this special edition of the Hinrich Foundation’s podcast on global trade, the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents-USA sits down with Evan Medeiros, Director of Asian Studies and the Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, to examine how the 2025 US-China trade war shifted from tariffs to chokepoints, exposing asymmetric vulnerabilities and ushering in a race for leverage across rare earths, semiconductors, and advanced technology.
The 2025 US-China trade war marked a structural shift in the bilateral relationship, moving beyond tariff escalation into a broader contest over chokepoints, vulnerabilities, and leverage. What began as tit-for-tat tariff measures evolved into a supply chain conflict as Washington and Beijing targeted critical dependencies to impose costs and extract strategic advantage. China’s rare-earth export controls exposed US vulnerabilities in industrial supply chains, while US leverage in semiconductor design software and advanced chipmaking tools underscored China’s continued reliance on American capabilities.
Evan Medeiros, Director of Asian Studies and the Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, argues that this new phase is best understood as a race: each side is trying to reduce its exposure to the other’s leverage while expanding its own. The result is a more fragile and disruptive form of competition, where interdependence itself can be weaponized as a source of power.
Tune in to this podcast as Medeiros joins the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents-USA to examine how the US and China are adapting to a more contested era of economic interdependence. The podcast draws on Medeiros’s recent white paper for the National Bureau of Asian Research, published with support from the Hinrich Foundation, “A New Era of US-China Interaction: From Competing to Racing.”
Tune into the Hinrich Foundation’s podcast series for insights on international trade.
Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Roseanne Gerin: As you mentioned, China's weaponization of rare-earth export controls fundamentally changed the bilateral dynamic. What did Beijing learn from that episode, and what did Washington learn?
Evan Medeiros: Well, it's important to understand that both sides weaponized chokepoint control. So yes, the Chinese identified a very, very significant vulnerability that was very disruptive to American industrial supply chains, especially these rare earths, but in particular, the magnets were critical for making engines for EVs [electric vehicles]. And as I note in the article, there was even a Ford factory that had to shut down for a few weeks because they lacked the inputs necessary to keep engine production going.
But the US had its own chokepoint controls, and that is that the Chinese rely on American companies for access to software that is critical in the design and manufacture of advanced semiconductors. The Chinese rely on the US for access to jet engines for commercial aircraft, which the Chinese are building. So, the US had its own chokepoint controls, but I think what the Chinese learned was that they had this tool that could hold at risk US manufacturing in a very, very significant way and that the US really had no response. The US had no alternative. It's not like we could just buy rare earths at a higher price in some other part of the global market. And so, for them, I think what they recognize is that they had a source of leverage that they had not had before and that the possession of that new source of leverage could be very, very significant with the Trump administration because it was so comfortable brandishing threats and using threats like tariffs as a way to put pressure on the Chinese, and the Chinese believe that they found a solution to that.
Roseanne Gerin: A major theme in your paper is that the US-China relationship has entered what you call a race — not just for advantage, but for insulation from the other side's leverage. You argue that the US-China relationship is defined by asymmetric vulnerabilities: The US has broad vulnerabilities but narrow leverage, while China has narrow vulnerabilities but broad leverage. How does that asymmetry contribute to the fragile stability you describe, and what makes this equilibrium so precarious?
Evan Medeiros: Well, let's first take the racing concept. So, I put forward the racing concept because I wanted to advance the conversation about strategic competition. When people ask, “How do you describe the US-China relationship?” It's easy and cheesy to say, “Ah, it's a strategic competition.” But of course, that doesn't really tell you very much. And what I found through my research on the trade war was actually there was a very specific dynamic that emerged from that trade war, which was China had certain leverage, America had vulnerabilities, China had vulnerabilities, America had certain leverage. And so, in many ways, the core essence of the competition, at least now it will likely change as the US-China competition evolves over time, but you have a point where the US is focused on reducing its vulnerability to China's leverage on rare earths, and the Chinese are focused on reducing their vulnerability to America's leverage, in particular, in the semiconductor or advanced semiconductor supply chain.